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ABSTRACT: Conscience exemption laws, which permit refusals of service based
on personal or religious belief, echo the formal equality approach embodied in
antidiscrimination laws. They attempt to promote individual religious autonomy
without taking into consideration the power and information disparities between
institutional and individual actors and the harm that refusals can cause. Martha
Fineman's vulnerability theory turns formal equality on its head by dismantling
our conception of independent individuals, who are freely able to achieve equal
outcomes if they are treated alike, and by explaining that the shared vulnerability
of all people requires a responsive state to address unequal access to resources
that improve resiliency. Focusing on the reproductive healthcare setting, this
Article uses vulnerability theory to identify the weaknesses in current conscience
exemption laws and to argue the vulnerable patient's right to information and
unfettered medical decisionmaking outweighs the conscience exemption rights
of institutions and individuals charged with providing such important social
services. Accordingly, the state should take action to prohibit institutions from
denying care on the basis of conscience and limit the ability of individual
providers to conscientiously object.
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INTRODUCTION
Many people know the story of Savita Halappanavar. Savita was seventeen
weeks pregnant on October 12, 2012, when she went to a hospital in Galway,
Ireland complaining of back pain.' She learned she was miscarrying and there
was no hope for the baby's survival, so Savita requested several times that
doctors complete the miscarriage through an abortion. 2 Abortion to save the life
of the mother is legal in Ireland, but the hospital waited three more days-until
the fetus died-to complete the miscarriage. 3 The hospital refused to perform an
abortion while the fetus was still alive "because Ireland is a Catholic country."4
By the time the hospital acted, it was too late to save Savita's life from the deadly
blood infection and septic shock caused by the dying fetus inside of her.5
Savita's story captured news headlines around the world and sparked
international outrage. Fewer people hear the stories of the women who similarly
are denied reproductive healthcare by religious healthcare organizations in the
United States.6 When Mindy Swank's water broke at twenty weeks and she
1. Peter Taggart & Laura Smith-Spark, Woman's Death in Ireland Abortion Case Ruled 'Medical
Misadventure,' CNN (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/19/world/europe/ireland-abortion-
controversy-inquest/.
2. Id. The established standard of care for unstable patients who are miscarrying is an immediate
surgical uterine evacuation, otherwise known as an abortion. Craig P. Griebel et al., Management of
Spontaneous Abortions, 72 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1243, 1246-48 (2005). Early intervention by abortion
reduces the patient's risk of complications, which can include blood loss, infection, and even death. Lori
R. Freedman et al., When There's a Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management in Catholic-Owned Hospitals,
98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1774, 1776-77 (2008).
3. Taggart & Smith-Spark, supra note 1; Irish Jury Finds Poor Care in Death of Woman Denied
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/world/europe/jury-cites-
poor-medical-care-in-death-of-indian-woman-in-ireland.html.
4. Taggart & Smith-Spark, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See generally Below the Radar: Health Care Providers' Religious Refusals Can Endanger
Women 's Lives and Health, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR. (Jan. 2011), https://nwlc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/nwlcbelowtheradar20 11.pdf; Julia Kaye et al., Healthcare Denied: Patients and
Physicians Speak Out About Catholic Hospitals and the Threat to Women's Health and Lives, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION (May 2016),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field-document/healthcaredenied.pdf; Amanda Marcotte, A
Miscarrying Woman Was Denied Medication Because of "Conscience," SLATE (Apr. 14, 2015),
94 [Vol. 29:93
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learned that her fetus would not survive, she was refused an abortion by a
Catholic hospital in Illinois because there was still a fetal heartbeat.7 When she
woke up bleeding a few weeks later, Mindy sought care at another nearby
hospital. She asked the doctors there to complete the miscarriage through an
abortion but they likewise refused, citing the religious affiliation of the Catholic
hospital.9 As weeks passed and Mindy's physical condition worsened, she
returned to the hospital several times, and each time she was turned away without
being informed that she could seek an abortion elsewhere.'o It was not until
Mindy began severely hemorrhaging that the hospital induced labor." As
expected, the baby died shortly after delivery.12
Mindy is not alone. Numerous women in the United States have been denied
care by healthcare facilities, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and other healthcare
workers based on their religious or personal beliefs. Savita's healthcare providers
questioned their legal ability to act in a predominantly Catholic country where
Catholic beliefs are enshrined in law.1 3 In the United States, healthcare providers
and institutions that refuse to provide care often do so because of their personal
beliefs, not pursuant to any perceived or actual legal prohibition. Under laws
known as conscience exemptions, the expense, time, embarrassment, emotional
harm, and risk to a patient's physical health caused by conscientious refusals of
care are perfectly legal. This is because, in an effort to protect the religious
exercise of healthcare providers and facilities, state and federal laws allow these
individuals and entities to refuse to provide any treatment they believe is wrong,
even when that refusal hurts patients.
Conscience exemptions embody the "formal equality" approach to anti-
discrimination law.1 4 They attempt to promote individual religious autonomy
without taking into consideration the power and information disparities between
institutional and individual actors. In the healthcare setting, this can mean that
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xxfactor/2015/04/14/miscarrying-woman-denied medicationmisoprostol
canbeused for both abortion.html.
7. Kaye et al., supra note 6, at 8.





13. Taggart & Smith-Spark, supra note 1. The death of Savita Halappanavar led to the passage of
the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act, which defines when a woman's life is at risk such that an
abortion may be performed. See Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (Act No. 35/2013) (Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/act/35/enacted/en/pdf.
14. In other words, conscience exemptions are meant to place all persons with their varying
religious beliefs on equal footing before the law, so that no one is forced to act in a way that is contrary to
his or her beliefs. "Formal equality promotes individual justice as the basis for a moral claim to virtue and
is reliant upon the proposition that fairness (the moral virtue) requires consistent or equal treatment." The
Ideas ofEquality and Non-Discrimination: Formal and Substantive Equality, EQUAL RTS. TRUST 2 (Nov.
8, 2007), http://www.equalrightstrust.org/content/ideas-equality-and-non-discrimination-formal-and-
substantive-equality (citing Murray Wesson, Equality and Social Rights: An Exploration in Light of the
South African Constitution, 2007 PUB. L. 748, 751).
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conscience exemptions favor institutional conscience or religious beliefs over the
beliefs and choices of individual providers and patients. In practice, conscience
exemptions also often favor some religious beliefs over others.
Martha Fineman offers an alternative to traditional equal protection
analysis-vulnerability theory-which, rather than concentrating on equal
treatment of perceived independent individuals, recognizes that formally equal
treatment under the law can reinforce existing inequalities in practice. Focusing
on the reproductive healthcare setting, this Article re-frames the debate on
conscience exemptions by using Fineman's vulnerability theory to identify the
weaknesses in current conscience exemption laws. The Article asserts that the
vulnerable patient's right to information and unfettered medical decisionmaking
should outweigh the conscience exemption rights of institutions charged with
providing such important social services. The conscientious objections of an
individual provider may sometimes be balanced with the rights of the patient.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of conscience exemptions,
beginning with the Church Amendment and other legislation implemented in the
years following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. Part I goes on to
discuss recent interest in conscience exemption legislation as part of the
conservative movement to limit women's access to reproductive healthcare and
to expand the religious freedom shield in favor of corporate and institutional
actors. Part II challenges the formal equality framework underlying conscience
exemptions and provides an explanation of vulnerability theory. Part III utilizes
vulnerability theory to highlight the dangers of conscience exemptions by
explaining how mergers of large Catholic hospital systems with secular
institutions have greatly limited access to reproductive healthcare and created
conflicts among healthcare institutions, providers, and patients. Part III also
argues that, in order to balance the disparities among patients, healthcare
providers, and organizations while meeting its obligation to ensure that
vulnerable citizens have access to healthcare resources, the state must favor the
conscience of the patient over those of more powerful institutional and individual
actors. Part IV concludes by offering a prescriptive remedy in the form of draft
federal legislation to prohibit institutions from denying care on the basis of
conscience and limit the ability of individual providers to conscientiously object.
The legislation provides a private right of action against healthcare institutions
that fail to provide adequate care to their patients.
I. CONSCIENCE EXEMPTIONS IN THE HEALTHCARE SETTING
Under common law, medical personnel and institutions typically have no
legal duty to provide patients with medical services or to accept any person as a
Freedom from Religion
patient.15 However, courts have recognized that once a provider accepts an
individual as a patient, the physician is in a fiduciary relationship with that
individual; as a result, "undivided loyalty to a patient should guide a physician's
decisions, and . . . any influence on a physician's decisions-other than the
patient's welfare-must be disclosed to the patient." 16 Providers also have a legal
duty to obtain informed consent from their patients, which includes providing
sufficient information on all of the options that "either fit within the standard of
care or would be considered material to a reasonable patient's decision." 7 The
duty to obtain informed consent "is based on professional ethical standards,
many of which have been incorporated into law by statute, regulation, and
common law."'8 The American Medical Association (AMA), the nation's largest
provider group, recognizes the duty of physicians to place patient welfare above
all other considerations.' 9 Likewise, the American Congress of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists has advised that the primary duty to the patient must be fulfilled
regardless of the provider's personal beliefs.20 Additionally, the Code of Ethics
of the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics requires that a
physician's right to preserve his or her own moral or religious values cannot
result in the imposition of those values on the patient, nor can the physician's
15. However, there are many statutes that create a duty to treat in emergency situations. Federal
and state statutes require emergency rooms to stabilize or treat all patients suffering from emergency
conditions or in active labor. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd (2012).
16. Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered Care and Limitations
on the Right to Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 141, 172 (2010).
17. All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize physician liability based on lack of
informed consent. Id. at 164.
18. Id.
19. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MED. ETHICS, § 1.1.1 (2016) ("The relationship between a patient
and a physician is based on trust, which gives rise to physicians' ethical responsibility to place patients'
welfare above the physician's own self-interest or obligations to others, to use sound medical judgment
on patients' behalf, and to advocate for their patients' welfare."); id. § 1.1.5 (noting that a physician may
not terminate treatment without giving the patient reasonable assistance and time to make alternative
arrangements for care); id. § 1.1.7 (instructing physicians to "[u]phold standards of informed consent and
inform the patient about all relevant options for treatment, including options to which the physician
morally objects"); id. § 2.1.1 (explaining that informed consent must be honored by physicians and
requires accurate presentation of medical facts and therapeutic alternatives); id. § 2.1.3 ("Except in
emergency situations in which a patient is incapable of making an informed decision, withholding
information without the patient's knowledge or consent is ethically unacceptable.").
20. ACOG Committee Opinion: The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine,
AM. CONG. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Nov. 2007), http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-
Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/The-Limits-of-Conscientious-Refusal-in-
Reproductive-Medicine. The opinion makes several recommendations to balance the obligations of
providers with a respect for conscience. For example, "providers with moral or religious objections should
practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their views" and should not staff sites where
objectionable requests are likely to arise. In emergency situations, the obligation to provide medically
indicated and requested care must override the provider's objections. Providers must give their patients
prior notice of personal or moral commitments, without arguing or advocating for the provider's position.
They must provide "scientifically accurate and professionally accepted characterizations of reproductive
health services," regardless of their personal beliefs. Finally, "institutions that uphold doctrinal objections
should not position themselves as primary providers" where those objections could impact patient care.
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right absolve the physician from the duty to "tak[e] immediate steps in an
emergency to ensure that the necessary treatment is given without delay." 21
Under legal, ethical, and professional standards, a hospital or provider that
refuses to discuss treatment options or their effects with a patient, or that provides
medically inaccurate or incomplete information, violates the patient's right to
information and to accept or refuse treatment and breaches its legal and ethical
duties to the patient. However, federal and state conscience exemptions override
the rights of patients in this regard. Conscience exemptions permit providers and
healthcare institutions to opt out of their ethical and moral duties to treat their
patients and provide information or patient referrals, putting the health and safety
of their patients at risk.
A. History of Conscience Exemptions
Although conscience exemptions today are sometimes used to restrict access
to any type of medical care, they were initially designed to limit access only to
abortion, sterilization, and birth control. Congress passed the first conscience
exemption in the early 1970s in response to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Roe v. Wade 22 and Doe v. Bolton23 and a district court ruling that enjoined a
Catholic hospital from refusing to permit tubal ligations following delivery. 24
The Church Amendment allowed individuals and entities that receive federal
funding to resist requirements that they perform or provide facilities for abortions
or sterilizations if those procedures would be "contrary to [the individual or
entity's] religious beliefs or moral convictions." 25 The Church Amendment,
borrowing language from recently passed civil rights laws, also prohibited
entities that receive certain federal funds from discriminating in the employment,
promotion, or termination of personnel who refuse to perform or participate in
the performance of abortion or sterilization procedures.26 After the Church
Amendment, states passed their own conscience exemption laws, over time
21. Christina Fiala & Joyce H. Arthur, "Dishonourable Disobedience"-Why Refusal To Treat in
Reproductive Healthcare Is Not Conscientious Objection, I WOMAN: PSYCHOSOMATIC GYNAECOLOGY
& OBSTETRICS 12, 13 (2014).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a limited constitutional right to abortion).
23. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (holding that states must permit abortions where necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother).
24. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Mont. 1973) (dissolving the injunction
in light of recently enacted federal conscience exemptions).
25. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2012). The Church
Amendment is one of the few conscience exemption laws that prohibit discrimination against medical
personnel who do perform abortions or sterilizations, notjust those who refuse to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-
7(c). Two states, Kentucky and Michigan, do prohibit discrimination based on prior or off-site
performance of abortion or sterilization procedures. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(5)(b)-(c) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20184 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c). The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 had prohibited religious
discrimination in public accommodation, employment, and housing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-05 (2012).
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expanding the types of services, healthcare professionals, and institutions that
were allowed to refuse to provide healthcare services. By the end of 1974, more
than half of the states had enacted laws mirroring or expanding the federal
protections; within four years, nearly all states had enacted such laws. 27
In the backlash against the introduction of emergency contraception in the
late 1990s, states and the federal government began to expand the scope of
conscience legislation. 28 The new laws broadened conscience exemptions by
expanding them beyond abortion and sterilization to contraception, end-of-life
care, stem cell research, and in some cases to any healthcare service to which a
religious or moral objection might be raised. The new laws also expanded
conscience exemptions to apply to more types of organizations. 29 Conscience
exemptions have expanded to cover not just doctors, nurses, and healthcare
institutions, but also pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, orderlies,
administrative staff, a wide array of health facilities, and even insurance
companies. 30 Increasingly distant interactions now fall within permissible
refusal."1 For example, the Coats Amendment was passed in 1996 to prohibit the
federal government and recipients of government funding from discriminating
against providers that refuse to offer training in abortion services due to religious
objections.32 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allowed insurance companies
administering Medicare and Medicaid benefits to object to the provision of
information about healthcare, as well as to the provision of services. 33 The
Budget Act provided that Medicaid managed-care plans and Medicare Choice
plans may object to providing counseling or referral services on moral or
religious grounds. 34 Yet, in all other contexts, Medicaid managed-care
27. Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Expanding Conscience, Shrinking Care: The Crisis in Access to
Reproductive Care and the Affordable Care Act's Nondiscrimination Mandate, 124 YALE L.J. 2470, 2478
(2015). "Even in the 1970s, as refusal laws were just beginning to take hold, the dangers were clear; the
Iowa Attorney General cautioned that 'one could eventually get to the point where the man who mines
the iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is used by a factor to make instruments used in abortions,
could refuse to work on conscientious grounds."' Id. at 2483.
28. See State Laws and Policies: Refusing to Provide Health Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar.
1, 2017) [hereinafter Refusing to Provide Health Services],
https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-RPHS.pdf; see also Adam Sonfield, Rights vs.
Responsibilities: Professional Standards and Provider Refusals, 8 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REv. 7 (2005);
State Laws and Policies: Emergency Contraception, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
Emergency Contraception], http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibEC.pdf.
29. Deutsch, supra note 27, at 2482.
30. Elizabeth Sepper, Not Only the Doctor's Dilemma: The Complexity of Conscience in Medicine,
4 FAULKNER L. REv. 385, 396 (2013).
31. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(a) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 18, 2017) (allowing
any "health care provider" to object to any phase of a patient's medical care, treatment, or procedure-
right down to the orderlies, who can refuse to change the bedding for a patient undergoing a medical
procedure to which the orderly objects).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2012).
33. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
34. See 41 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (2012); 48 C.F.R. §
1609.7001 (c)(7) (2016).
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organizations are explicitly prohibited from imposing gag rules on doctors.35 The
Weldon Amendment of 2005 prohibited Health and Human Services
appropriations from being made available to any state or local government that
"subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on
the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage
of, or refer for abortions."36 The amendment defines "health care entity" to
include HMOs and insurance plans. 37 It thus limits the ability of states to require
care, referral, or insurance coverage for abortion, and opens the door to
conscientious refusals several steps removed from the direct provision of care.
Currently, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have at least one
law that allows medical providers or institutions to refuse to provide at least one
medical service.38 Of these states, only California, Maryland, Nevada, and the
District of Columbia have exceptions to each refusal law that require a provider
or institution to take actions that may contravene their objections where patient
safety or an emergency requires it. 39 Four other states have an exception for when
the life of the patient is endangered in at least one, but not all, of their laws
allowing refusal. 40 This "leaves forty-three states with at least one refusal law
that does not ensure that patients will receive emergency care if that care conflicts
with a provider's conscience, even in some situations where the patient's life is
in danger."41 Under most of today's conscience clauses, providers who refuse to
provide services, information, or referrals are protected from discrimination in
hiring, staff privileges, or promotion,42 and from professional discipline, civil
action, or regulatory or criminal sanctions.4 3 Likewise, refusing institutions are
35. Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: The Quest for
Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 784
(2007). "Federal dollars typically come with conditions set forth by the federal government. For example,
to receive Medicaid and Medicare dollars, hospitals must satisfy certain Conditions of Participation,
including requirements to ensure that the patient be 'informed of his or her health status, ... involved in
care planning and treatment, and . . . able to request or refuse treatment."' Lois Uttley et al., Miscarriage
of Medicine: The Growth of Catholic Hospitals and the Threat to Reproductive Health Care, AM. Civ.
LIBERTIES UNION & MERGERWATCH 10 (Dec. 2013) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 482.13 (2016)),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/growth-of-catholic-hospitals-2013.pdf.
36. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 803.
37. Id.
38. See Who Decides?: The Status of Women's Reproductive Rights in the United States, NARAL
PRO-CHOICE AM. (26th ed. 2017), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/WhoDecides20l7-DigitalEdition3.pdf
39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(d) (West 2010); D.C. CODE § 22-B9006 (LexisNexis
2010); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 20-214(d) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449.191 (West 2010).
40. IDAHO CODE § 18-611(6) (2004); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2010); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.100(2)
(2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-728c(l), 1-741(C) (West 2010); TEx. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.004
(West 2010).
41. Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 16, at 177-78. "Alabama, New Hampshire, and Vermont do
not have refusal laws." Id. at 178 n.143; see also Refusing to Provide Health Services, supra note 28;
Emergency Contraception, supra note 28.
42. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3205(C)(1) (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-3 (West 2000).
43. Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REv. 1501, 1509-10 (2012).
[Vol. 29:93100
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protected from civil action and regulatory or criminal sanctions, regardless of the
harm caused by their refusal."
B. The Expansion of Conscience Exemptions
In the past few years, conscience exemptions have further broadened the
categories of people who have the right of refusal and the places in which that
right may be exercised. Now, not only are some providers able to refuse to
perform medical procedures-no matter the circumstances and without
consequences-but they can refuse to give information or a referral to a patient
who requires medical care.45 Third parties wholly uninvolved in the provision of
care can interfere with a patient's ability to access information or care because
the third party argues he or she would be "complicit" in someone else's immoral
behavior. 46 In what has been called the "conscience creep," 47 for-profit
employers, independent business owners, and secular employees are making
"complicity-based conscience claims" 48 to impose their worldview on
employees, customers, coworkers, and others.49 For example, in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby,so employers argued that the Affordable Care Act's mandate that
they provide employees health insurance that covered reproductive healthcare
would "make them complicit with employees who might use the insurance to
purchase forms of contraception that the employers viewed as sinful."" The
Supreme Court accepted that argument, finding Hobby Lobby's free exercise of
religion was substantially burdened by the contraception mandate and therefore
the contraception mandate violated the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
44. In addition, "twenty-seven states shift responsibility for injury resulting from refusals to the
patient by immunizing individuals or hospitals from liability stemming from a refusal to provide care."
Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 16, at 178.
45. See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251. The Medicare
conscience clause appears at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (2012), and the Medicaid conscience clause
provision is at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (2012). But see 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2-70/9 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (amending the Healthcare Right of Conscience Act to require that
informational and access-to-care protocols are in place to ensure that patients receive material information
in a timely fashion, and that conscientious refusals will not impair the patient's health by causing delay or
inability to access the refused healthcare service).
46. See generally Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015).
47. Dahlia Lithwick, Conscience Creep: What's So Wrong with Conscience Clauses?, SLATE (Oct.
3, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/is-there-a-principled
.waytorespond_to theproliferation_of conscience.html.
48. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 46, at 2516.
49. See Reva Siegel & Douglas Nelaime, Conscience and the Culture Wars, AM. PROSPECT (June
29, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/conscience-and-culture-wars.
50. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2013).
51. Neiaime & Siegel, supra note 46, at 2518; see also Sarah M. Stephens, The Search for
Authenticity and the Manipulation of Tradition: Restrictions on Women's Reproductive Rights in the
United States and Egypt, 19 CARDOZO JL. & GENDER 325 (2013) (discussing how politicians use the
language of religion to limit women's reproductive choices in an effort to gain political capital).
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Act.52 In response, federal legislation was proposed that would expand the
Court's ruling by allowing any employer or insurance company to refuse to cover
any of the preventative services or essential health benefits required to be
covered by the Affordable Care Act, including prenatal testing, birth control, or
other prescription drugs. 53 Additionally, the legislation would not only make the
Weldon Amendment permanent, but would expand it by extending its scope to
any healthcare professional who "participate[s]" in the provision of abortion,
regardless of how tangential that participation.54
Unfortunately, the success of conscience exemption laws in limiting access
to reproductive healthcare has led to their use as models for the creation of
religious exceptions in other contexts. In the wake of Hobby Lobby, state and
federal religious freedom bills have proliferated as conservatives have used the
language of conscience exemptions to permit discrimination against LGBT
individuals.5 5 The proposed federal First Amendment Defense Act, for example,
would prohibit governmental actors from taking "discriminatory" action against
a person who "believes or acts in accordance with a religious belief or moral
conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and
one woman, or that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage,"
thus allowing discrimination against LGBT persons, single mothers, unmarried
couples, and others.5 6 Just as with conscience exemptions in the healthcare
context, the stated intent of such legislation is to prevent discrimination against
individuals and institutions on the basis of their beliefs. The next Part explains
52. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759; see also Sarah M. Stephens, An Employer's Conscience After
Hobby Lobby and the Continuing Conflict Between Women's Rights and Religious Freedom, 24 BUFF. J.
GENDER L. & Soc. POL'Y 1 (2015) (discussing the Court's application of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to Hobby Lobby's challenge). The contraceptive mandate continues to be challenged. In
2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in seven consolidated cases challenging the Court's
amendment to the contraceptive coverage mandate. Several religious nonprofits argued that submitting a
notification to the government that they have a religious objection to providing contraceptive insurance
coverage substantially burdens their free exercise of religion. In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated
the judgments of the lower courts and remanded with instructions to the parties to reach a compromise
that accommodates the petitioners' religious exercise while simultaneously ensuring full and equal
healthcare coverage, including contraceptive coverage. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559-60
(2016). The Court notably refused to express any views on the merits of the case. Id. at 1560.
53. Health Care Conscience Rights Act, H.R. 940, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); The Health Care
Conscience Rights Act Would Undermine Laws that Protect Women's and Families' Access to Health
Care, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR. (June 2015), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/labor-h-hccra
6.24.155.pdf.
54. H.R. 940 § 4.
55. Seventeen states introduced religious freedom legislation in 2015. See 2015 State Religious
Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx.
56. First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2015); Carolyn Davis,
Advancing Progressive Religious Liberty in 2016, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/29112636/ProgressiveReligiousLiberty
Report.pdf But see Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677 (S.D. Miss. June 30, 2016) (granting a
preliminary injunction against a similar Mississippi law, which provides protections to those with
sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions reflecting disapproval of lesbian, gay, transgender,
and unmarried persons and allows discrimination in both public accommodations and healthcare).
57. H.R. 2802 § 3(a).
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how conscience exemptions fail to achieve the equal protection goals they
purportedly pursue and analyzes conscience exemptions through the lens of
vulnerability theory, with the goal of eliminating barriers to reproductive
healthcare.
II. VULNERABILITY THEORY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FORMAL EQUALITY
APPROACH TO CONSCIENCE EXEMPTIONS
Formal equality requires that "things that are alike should be treated alike."58
Thus, the formal equality approach is concerned with applying the same rules to
similar situations; it aims for procedural equality, rather than equality of outcome
or substantive equality. Under the formal equality paradigm, the government
does not normally intervene in interactions between private actors unless there is
a claim of discrimination based on some characteristics protected by law. For
example, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are
prohibited from taking adverse employment actions against employees because
of certain discrete characteristics, such as religious belief, race, or gender. 9 The
formal equality approach mandates that employers act without regard to these
and other specific protected characteristics in an effort to eradicate
discrimination and ensure equal opportunity regardless of those protected
characteristics.
Conscience exemptions borrow from the language and the approach of civil
rights law to prohibit adverse actions against healthcare employees, healthcare
workers who are not employees, and healthcare institutions that exercise their
conscience by refusing to provide necessary reproductive healthcare. However,
the formal equality approach used in civil rights law and borrowed by conscience
exemptions is highly problematic in both design and effect. Currently protected
characteristics are both over- and under- inclusive because not all members of a
protected class are disadvantaged, while individuals who are outside of protected
classes (e.g., an under-forty, able-bodied white male) may be disadvantaged in
ways that are not protected (e.g., by poverty).60 Therefore, the formal equality
approach does not adequately take into account the bases on which people are
discriminated against. Moreover, because the enforcement mechanism of the
formal equality paradigm is to punish wrongdoers who act with discriminatory
animus, it can only stamp out surface-level discrimination. It has no mechanism
to address "existing structural, social, societal, and individual inequalities,"
which result in substantively unequal outcomes even when individuals are given
58. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV.
575, 578 (1983) (citing 3 ARiSTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA 1131a-31b (W. Ross. trans. 1925)).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2015).
60. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Evolving Images of Gender and Equality: A Feminist
Journey, 43 NEw ENG. L. REV. 437(2009).
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formally equal opportunities.61 Formal equality fails to achieve the desired effect
of eliminating discrimination. In fact, it is unable to address or even truly
consider existing social imbalances or "disrupt persistent forms of inequality."62
As Fineman puts it, "[flormal equality is inevitably uneven equality because
existing inequalities abound throughout society and a concept of equality that is
merely formal in nature cannot adequately address them." 63
Even to the extent formal equality is sometimes useful in remedying certain
types of discriminatory treatment, conscience exemptions are a poor fit for this
theoretical framework and end up exacerbating existing inequalities between
patients and the healthcare industry. Conscience exemptions prohibit
discrimination against providers and institutions that exercise their religious or
personal beliefs, even when doing so conflicts with their primary duty of care.
While drafted in the language of laws meant to remedy historical discrimination
against disenfranchised and less powerful groups of people, conscience
exemptions actually have the opposite effect. Indeed, if the intent of formal
equality is to provide equal opportunity, conscience exemptions fail because they
afford more opportunity to the more powerful party in interactions between
patient and provider, patient and institution, and provider and institution, instead
of privileging or at least protecting the weaker party-the patient-in order to
provide a more even playing field. Guaranteeing the right to deny care in the
middle of a course of treatment or in an emergency only exacerbates the disparity
in power between the individual and the healthcare provider or institution and
greatly increases the risk of harm to the dependent patient.
Martha Fineman developed vulnerability theory in response to the failures
of a formal equality framework to achieve substantively equal outcomes. In the
words of Fineman:
Our equality is weak, its promise largely illusory because it fails to take
into account the existing inequalities of circumstances created both by
inevitable and universal vulnerability inherent in the human condition
and the societal institutions that have grown up around them. It is as
though these inequalities were the products of natural forces beyond the
ability of the state or law to remedy or rectify. They may be beyond the
ability of the state under current ideological configurations, but they are
certainly not natural. The state and legal institutions confer senses of
entitlement and values, including through a regime of equality that
facilitates some results and protects and privileges some persons over,
or instead of, others.64
61. Id. at 449.
62. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008).
63. Fineman, supra note 60, at 447-48.
64. Id. at 450.
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Fineman insists that political and legal theorists recognize the futility of the
prevailing ideologies of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and personal responsibility,
which are predicated on the existence of a liberal subject who is competent,
rational, and able to negotiate contract terms, assess options, and play "multiple
and concurrent societal roles."65 She offers an alternative framework that
concentrates on the common vulnerability within and impacting all people,
"claim[ing] the term 'vulnerable' for its potential in describing a universal,
inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the heart of
our concept of social and state responsibility" necessary to achieve substantive
equality for all people. 66 Vulnerability theory begins with recognizing the
inherent and constant state of vulnerability across all people's lifetimes and then
explores strategies to mitigate that vulnerability.
According to vulnerability theory, human beings cannot become more or less
vulnerable, but they can become more or less resilient to their inherent
vulnerability. Importantly, resilience is not innate but is "is produced within and
through institutions and relationships of privilege defined and reinforced by
law." 67 The role of the government is inescapable; "the state is always actively
involved in the allocation, preservation, or maintenance of privilege and
disadvantage" because of the law's role in shaping public and private societal
relationships and institutions.6 ' Therefore, governments have a responsibility to
ensure that all people have equal access to "the societal institutions that distribute
resources" and improve human resiliency. 69 As Fineman puts it, "[v]ulnerability
thus freed from its limited and negative associations is a powerful conceptual
tool with the potential to define an obligation for the state to ensure a richer and
more robust guarantee of equality than is currently afforded under the equal
protection model."70 Vulnerability theory places the individual in social context
and "redirect[s] focus onto the societal institutions that are created in response to
individual vulnerability."71
In defining the obligations of the state, Fineman draws on the work of Peadar
Kirby to identify different types of assets that social organizations and
institutions provide, including what Kirby termed "human assets." 72 Kirby and
Fineman conclude that health is one of the primary "human assets" that affect
material well-being.73 Fineman argues that "asset accumulation by individuals
65. Fineman, supra note 62, at 8; see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 18-22 (2004).
66. Fineman, supra note 62, at 8; see FINEMAN, supra note 65, at xxii, 49-50.
67. Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative: What Vulnerability Is and Is Not, EMORY
UNIV., http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/about/concepts.html.
68. Id.
69. Nina A. Kohn, Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM I,
3 (2014).
70. Fineman, supra note 62, at 8-9; see generally FINEMAN, supra note 65.
71. Fineman, supra note 62, at 13.
72. PEADAR KIRBY, VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION 55 (2006).
73. Id. at 60.
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and the creation and maintenance of social institutions . . . coupled with the fact
that asset conferring institutions initially are brought into legal existence only
through state mechanisms, places such institutions within the domain of state
responsibility." 74 Accordingly, the shared vulnerability of all people legitimates
claims upon the state by individuals for meaningful access to healthcare
institutions that create the opportunity for better health and therefore more
resiliency, leading to greater substantive equality." Since healthcare institutions,
as "asset-conferring entities," distribute important social goods, they should be
heavily monitored by the state to ensure that the distribution of healthcare is
equitable and fair.76
III. PRIVILEGING INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE OVER INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE
Indeed, the healthcare industry is heavily regulated by local, state, and
federal governments, which dictate everything from licensing requirements, to
how drugs can be prescribed, to the width of the hallways in surgical facilities. 77
However, the healthcare industry is not regulated in a way that ensures access to
healthcare resources that will improve human resiliency. To the contrary, the
state of the law actually discourages access to critical reproductive care that can
improve not only individual health outcomes but broader social and economic
outcomes for patients, their families, and, in turn, their wider communities.7 ' As
explained, under most of today's conscience exemptions, an entire hospital,
healthcare system, clinic, or practice group may refuse to provide treatment,
information, and referrals. In several jurisdictions, broad conscience clauses
allow any corporation or entity associated with healthcare to decline to
participate in, refer for, or give information about any healthcare service for
reasons of conscience.79 When an entity wishes to refuse to provide certain
services, "[e]mployees and medical staff of all faiths, beliefs, and backgrounds
74. Fineman, supra note 62, at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTHCARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE (2007).
78. See Fact Sheet: Reproductive Health Is Part of the Economic Health of Women and Their
Families, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR. (May 2015) https://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/
pdfs/reproductive health-is-part-of the-economic health of women_5.29.15pdfpdf
79. Broad conscience exemption legislation typically does not differentiate between religious and
secular, public and private, or for-profit and not-for-profit institutions. However, Arkansas, Maine, and
Tennessee limit the reach of institutional conscience clauses to private institutions, and California and
New Jersey limit the reach of institutional conscience exemptions to religious institutions or organizations.
For example, in Doe v. Bridgeton HospitalAss'n, New Jersey's Supreme Court determined that the state's
conscience clause could not extend to private, nonsectarian hospitals because those hospitals are quasi-
public institutions with obligations to serve the public. 366 A.2d 641, 645-47 (N.J. 1976). Alaska's
conscience clause was similarly construed to prohibit a nonsectarian hospital from restricting the




must then abide by the institutional policy of refusal."o8 This has led to a rapid
reduction in the availability of reproductive healthcare as religious healthcare
institutions have merged with other religious and secular institutions and then
imposed mandatory refusal policies throughout the resulting mega-healthcare
organizations.
A. Catholic Hospital Mergers and the Influence ofHospital Directives on
Secular Hospitals
The spread of religious healthcare mergers is most clearly seen in the
proliferation of Catholic healthcare conglomerates. A 2013 study released by the
ACLU and MergerWatch, a consumer watchdog agency that advocates for
patients' rights when hospitals merge, found that by 2011, 10% of all acute-care
hospitals were Catholic-sponsored or -affiliated.8 1 The percentage was much
higher in some states. For example, the figure rose to 28% in Washington, 29%
in Wisconsin, 28% in Iowa, and 20% in Missouri.82 More recent mergers have
only increased the number of Catholic hospitals and healthcare systems. By
2016, 14.5% of all acute care hospitals in the United States were Catholic-owned
or -affiliated. 83 Over the period between 2001 and 2016, the number of Catholic-
owned or -operated hospitals "increased by 22 percent, while the number of acute
care hospitals overall dropped by 6 percent." 84 Today, "one in six hospital beds
in the United States is in a Catholic hospital."85 In some places, such as
Washington State and Wisconsin, more than 40% of all hospital beds are in
Catholic hospitals. 86
Increasingly, Catholic facilities are the sole or primary providers of
healthcare for a given region. The ACLU/MergerWatch Study found that thirty
Catholic hospitals were designated by the federal government as sole community
providers in 2011.8' Today, that number has risen to forty-six.88 Sole community
providers receive higher levels of reimbursements from the federal government
for providing care to a region.89 In fact, Catholic facilities receive billions of
taxpayer dollars each year. In 2011 alone, Catholic hospitals "billed Medicare
$81 billion and Medicaid $34 billion, for a combined total of $115 billion in
80. Sepper, supra note 43, at 1514.
81. Uttley et al., supra note 35, at 4.
82. Id.
83. Lois Uttley & Christine Khaikin, Growth of Catholic Hospitals and Health Systems: 2016




85. Kaye et al., supra note 6, at 6.
86. Id.
87. Uttley et al., supra note 35, at 5.
88. Uttley & Khaikin, supra note 83, at 1.
89. Uttley et al., supra note 35, at 5.
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'gross patient revenues."'90 These public sources accounted for 45.7% of total
revenues for Catholic hospitals, "on par with the percentages for other types of
hospitals, such as other religious non-profit hospitals (46.4 percent), for-profit
hospitals (44.6 percent), secular non-profit hospitals (45.2 percent), and public
hospitals (44.6 percent)." 9' This is despite the fact that Catholic hospitals provide
far less charity care than public hospitals and no more than other religiously
affiliated hospitals. 92
The disproportionate share of the healthcare market owned and operated by
Catholic hospitals is greatly concerning because religious-and particularly
Catholic-healthcare organizations are more likely than secular institutions to
take advantage of conscience exemptions by imposing strict rules about what
types of medical care and information they will or will not provide. After the
passage of the Church Amendment, Catholic hospitals began widely adopting
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, which
are promulgated by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB). 93 Adoption of the Directives helped Catholic hospitals bolster their
claim that they need conscience exemptions that override medical standards of
care and patient wishes.
Today, the Directives prohibit nearly all reproductive services, including all
birth control methods except natural family planning; emergency contraception;
infertility treatment; sterilization; and abortion.94 Research and therapy using
treatments derived from fetal tissue or embryonic stem cells are likewise
disallowed. 95 The Directives also limit the information doctors may provide to
what the USCCB considers to be morally legitimate healthcare alternatives. 96
The Directives further prohibit doctors from providing information that could
ultimately lead a patient to make a healthcare decision that the USCCB deems
immoral and would therefore make the USCCB complicit in the patient's sin,
regardless of the beliefs, desires, or needs of the patient.97 For example, Catholic
clinics "have refused to instruct HIV-positive patients as to the importance of
condoms and of cleaning needles used for intravenous drugs to prevent
transmission"; prohibited the release of prenatal testing results, even where the
90. Id. at 10. The hospitals reported $27 billion in combined Medicare and Medicaid net revenues
that year. Id.
9 1. Id.
92. Id. at 13. In 2011, Catholic hospitals "provided the lowest proportional level of service to
Medicaid patients of any type of hospital, as measured by the percentage of gross patient revenues that
came from Medicaid. . . ." Id. at 6.
93. Deutsch, supra note 27, at 2472-73, 2478; Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Care Services, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Directives],
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-
Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf.
94. See generally Directives, supra note 93.
95. Id. at 25.




test shows the fetus is not viable, because it might result in the woman's decision
to abort the fetus; and prohibited doctors from counseling rape victims about
emergency contraception. 98 The Directives contravene and provide a stark
contrast to ethical and professional standards, which require physicians to place
patient welfare and care above their own personal beliefs and which patently
prohibit physicians from withholding medical information from patients. 99
As a result of hundreds of mergers between religious and nonreligious
facilities since the 1990s, many healthcare systems that appear to be secular now
limit their services based on religious doctrine and refuse to comply with
professional and ethical standards of care.100 Further, ancillary care
organizations, such as healthcare clinics or nursing homes, that enter into
cooperative arrangements with Catholic healthcare systems are often required to
comply with the Directives and restrict the services they provide. 10 Even public
hospitals that are managed by Catholic healthcare systems and historically
Catholic hospitals that are now owned by secular non-profit or for-profit
healthcare systems often must follow the Directives.' 02 Catholic healthcare
systems are increasingly dominating the healthcare industry, with great power to
influence national health policy, impede the caregiving of over half a million
full-time healthcare workers, and limit the accessibility of reproductive
healthcare for individual patients throughout the country in small and large
markets alike. 103
Although its discretion over healthcare regulation is broad, the government
has failed to put in place laws to improve the resiliency of vulnerable individuals.
The government is critical in shaping the relationships among patients, providers,
and institutions because it regulates the creation and maintenance of all
healthcare facilities, public and private, and it contracts or expands access to
healthcare through its use of taxpayer money. The healthcare industry as it exists
today would collapse without government tax breaks, government funding, and
public insurance dollars. Non-profit hospitals, including Catholic healthcare
systems, receive billions of dollars in state and federal tax credits for providing
"charity care and community benefits."0'4 Instead of using its regulatory
98. Sepper, supra note 43, at 1521; see also ACLU v. Burwell, No. 3:16-cv-3539 (N.D. Cal. filed
June 24, 2016) (alleging that unaccompanied immigrant minors in the legal custody of the federal
government have been denied post-sexual assault care, including contraception and abortion, by
religiously affiliated organizations that are paid millions of dollars by the government to provide medical
care to these young people).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21.
100. Sepper, supra note 43, at 1523-24; see also Uttley et al., supra note 35, at 7.
101. Sepper, supra note 43, at 1523-24. In some cases, even after Catholic healthcare systems are
acquired by for-profit investor groups, the system continues to require compliance with the Directives. Id.
at 1523.
102. Kaye et al., supra note 6, at 7; Uttley et al., supra note 35, at 2-3.
103. Sepper, supra note 43, at 1519-20; see generally Lori R. Freedman et al., When There's a
Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management in Catholic-Owned Hospitals, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1774 (2008)
(recounting the experiences of obstetrician-gynecologists in Catholic hospitals).
104. See Uttley et al., supra note 35, at 32 n.64.
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authority to empower the vulnerable public, the government financially and
structurally supports the individuals and institutions that limit access to
resources. The government's failure to act has enabled monopolies on healthcare
by Catholic organizations, which use conscience exemptions to restrict access to
reproductive and other forms of healthcare. This problem might be addressed
through legislation that limits the ability of religious healthcare organizations to
buy out secular healthcare systems and monopolize the market. This Article
proposes a broader solution: legislation that prohibits healthcare institutions from
dictating individual healthcare choices or limiting access to care on the basis of
institutional beliefs.
B. Conflicts Between Refusing Institutions and Willing Providers
With numerous changes in corporate affiliation and ownership becoming
common, providers at formerly secular workplaces often find new limitations
imposed on the care that they can provide. For example, following the Directives
is a condition of employment for the healthcare workers employed at Catholic
institutions and a condition of admitting privileges for Catholic hospitals. 05
When a Catholic facility merges with another healthcare facility, the merged
facility and its individual providers must also abide by the Directives. 106
Providers at recently acquired or merged facilities must choose between
accepting new limits on care and finding alternative employment, which may not
be an option if the resulting entity is the largest or only provider in the area. In
one study, 43% of physicians "reported having practiced in a religiously
affiliated institution during their careers," and many of those facilities had
institutional policies of refusal. 10 7 In another study, one in five family physicians,
general internists, and general practitioners at religiously affiliated institutions
reported having experienced "conflict with the institution's religiously based
policies for patient care."ios The rates of conflict are even higher in facilities with
wide-ranging restrictions, as well as in certain specialties. 109 For example, one
survey reported that 37% of obstetrician-gynecologists (ob-gyns) who practice
in a religiously affiliated institution have faced conflicts over "religiously based
105. Sepper, supra note 43, at 1520. Restrictive admitting privileges make it even harder for
abortion providers to comply with Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws. See infra
note 115 and accompanying text.
106. Uttley et al., supra note 35, at 2-3.
107. Sepper, supra note 43, at 1518.
108. See Debra B. Stulberg et al., Religious Hospitals and Primary Care Physicians: Conflicts over
Policies for Patient Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 725, 727 (2010).
109. See Debra B. Stulberg et al., Obstetrician-Gynecologists, Religious Institutions, and Conflicts
Regarding Patient-Care Policies, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 73.el, 73.el, 73.e4 (2012).
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policies for patient care."" 0 More than half of ob-gyn respondents who work in
Catholic institutions reported conflicts." I
For some doctors and nurses, the decision to provide abortion or other
reproductive healthcare implicates deeply felt moral, ethical, and religious
values.' 12 Dr. Willie J. Parker, a well-known board-certified ob-gyn who
provides abortion care in the South, reflected that a sermon by Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. "challenged [him] to a deeper spiritual understanding" of the biblical
Good Samaritan and led him to the conclusion that he should provide care to
women seeking abortions to show the compassion required of him by his
religion.1 3 However, conscience exemption laws do not protect Dr. Parker or his
beliefs. Instead, conscience exemption laws are, for the most part, completely
one-sided in favor of beliefs that disapprove of reproductive and other types of
healthcare.11 4 Conscience exemptions allow providers in non-objecting hospitals
to refuse to provide certain services without professional, employment, or legal
consequence, but they do not protect physicians who want to provide those
services in an institution that refuses. This leaves a physician who does not object
to a particular service and who believes that she or he has a religious, moral, or
professional obligation to provide that service without protection from an
institutional prohibition. 115
110. Id. at 73.e4.
11. Id. On April 27, 2016, the California Medical Association moved to join a lawsuit against
Dignity Health, a Catholic hospital system, filed by a patient who had been denied a tubal ligation. The
California Medical Association objects to the Directives' improper lay interference with the physician's
medical judgment and the doctor-patient relationship, as well as the risk they pose to the quality and
accessibility of reproductive healthcare for women. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of California Medical Ass'n's Motion for Leave to File Complaint in Intervention, Chamorro v.
Dignity Health, No. 15-549626 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2016).
112. See generally LORI FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE: DOCTORS' CONSTRAINTS IN
ABORTION CARE (2010); see also Kaye et al., supra note 6 (recounting the stories of doctors who were
unable to provide care due to their affiliation with a religious hospital, or who took over care at a secular
institution after a patient was refused care at a Catholic institution).
113. Willie J. Parker, Why I Provide Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/opinion/why-i-provide-abortions.html?_r-0; see also John H.
Richardson, The Abortion Ministry of Dr. Willie Parker, ESQUIRE (July 30, 2014),
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a2377 1/abortion-ministry-of-dr-willie-parker-0914/ ("'The
protesters say they're opposed to abortion because they're Christian,' Parker says. 'It's hard for them to
accept that I do abortions because I'm a Christian."').
114. In the abortion context, conscience exemptions that protect the objecting provider but not the
provider who wants to deliver care tip the scales by impermissibly favoring certain religious beliefs over
others. See Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 689 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000)) (explaining that the Establishment Clause is violated when
"persons who hold contrary religious beliefs are unprotected").
115. Willing providers are further hindered by TRAP laws, which single out medical practices and
providers that offer abortion services and impose on them more burdensome requirements than are
imposed on similar medical procedures. For example, many TRAP laws restrict the performance of an
abortion, be it surgical or medical (i.e., by pill), to licensed doctors, thus limiting the number of abortion
providers by excluding nurse practitioners and others who are otherwise licensed to perform medical
procedures and prescribe and administer medication. State Laws and Policies: Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers. Other TRAP laws have required physicians who
perform abortions to have admitting privileges in a local hospital, a requirement that is not medically
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As Fineman explains, vulnerability theory "redirect[s] focus onto the
societal institutions that are created in response to individual vulnerability," with
the goal of creating a state that is "more responsive to, and responsible for,
vulnerability."' 1 6 Viewed through the lens of vulnerability theory, it is clear that
a conscience-based prohibition by an institution should yield in the face of a
willing individual provider. After all, the provider is increasing the healthcare
resources in the market and thereby facilitating the accumulation of material
resources that bolster individuals' resilience in the face of vulnerability.
Therefore, the conscience exemption paradigm as it currently exists must be
repealed or refrained in a way that increases access to care, rather than restricting
it.
C. Conflicts Between Refusing Institutions and Willing Patients: Diminishing
Women's Access to Information and Reproductive Healthcare Services
The effect of current conscience exemptions on access to healthcare is
significant. Although we do not know exactly how common healthcare refusals
are, according to one report, "29% of patients-or nearly 100 million
Americans-may be cared for by physicians who do not believe they have an
obligation to refer the patient to another provider for . . . treatments" to which
the physician objects.' Complaints regarding institutional or individual refusals
are rare for many reasons. Often, people do not know that they have been
subjected to a refusal, that a refusal is unethical or illegal, or that they may have
a remedy; they may also be concerned about their privacy. "8 Moreover, there is
justified and is made even more difficult by the fact that most local hospitals operate under religious
restrictions that prohibit admitting privileges for physicians who perform abortions. See Whole Woman's
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (holding that Texas's requirements that abortion providers
be admitted to a hospital within thirty miles of the abortion facility and that abortion facilities meet surgical
center requirements not otherwise applied to outpatient procedures placed a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking a pre-viability abortion and therefore created an unconstitutional undue burden on
abortion access); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
a Wisconsin law requiring an abortion provider to have admitting privileges to a hospital within thirty
miles of where the abortion was performed imposed an unconstitutional undue burden), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2545 (2016); Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that
an admitting privileges requirement that would have closed the only facility providing abortions in
Mississippi was unconstitutional), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2536 (2016). Despite the Court's holding in
Whole Woman 's Health, a number of states still have active laws that restrict the design of abortion
facilities, hospital transfer agreements, geographical location of abortion-providing facilities, and the
classes of health professionals who can perform abortions. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers,
REWIRE (Mar. 19, 2016), https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/targeted-regulation-of-
abortion-providers/ (tracking state restrictions on abortion); see also Jessica Picklo, Symposium: Abortion
Rights Come Out of the Shadow, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 27, 2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-abortion-rights-come-out-of-the-shadow/.
116. Fineman, supra note 62, at 13.
117. Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical Practices, 356 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 593, 597 (2007). "Many physicians do not consider themselves obligated to disclose
information about or refer patients for legal but morally controversial medical procedures." Id. at 593.
118. See Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 16, at 163.
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often a stigma attached to refusal, both because of the requested procedure or
treatment itself (such as abortion or emergency contraception) and because of the
embarrassment that can stem from being refused."' Still, an increasing number
of complaints are being made and drawing attention to the very real danger
conscience exemptions create for patients.
For example, in 2013, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against the USCCB on
behalf of Tamesha Means, a woman who was twice sent home from Mercy
Health Partners in Muskegon, Michigan, after her water broke at eighteen
weeks.1 20 The Catholic-affiliated hospital told Means there was nothing it could
do.121 The hospital failed to inform Means that she was miscarrying, that there
was no way that the fetus could survive, and that termination was the medically
prescribed and safest option.122 Instead, the hospital sent her home twice, despite
the fact that she was in extreme pain and had contracted an infection. The hospital
even attempted to send her home a third time before she began to deliver and was
admitted. 123 This is not the first time Mercy Health Partners has been accused of
denying care to a woman who was miscarrying. According to a report by a former
Muskegon County, Michigan, health official, Mercy Health Partners risked the
lives of five women between August 2009 and December 2010 by forcing them
to undergo painful, dangerous miscarriages of non-viable fetuses when the
standard of care would have been to immediately terminate the pregnancy.' 24
Tamesha Means' case and others like it demonstrate how conscience exemptions
allow healthcare institutions and providers to deny care to patients at the time
when they are least resilient and the disparity in power between provider and
patient is greatest.
In 2015, the ACLU filed an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit against another
Catholic hospital system in Michigan, Trinity Health Corporation, for its
"repeated[] and systemic[] fail[ure] to provide women suffering pregnancy
complications" with medically indicated emergency abortions as required by
federal law.1 25 The use of conscience exemptions to deny care is exacerbated by
the extent to which religious institutions serve as the primary sources of care
throughout much of the country. Trinity Health Corporation is one of the largest
119. Id. at 160-61.
120. Complaint at 2, Means v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, No. 1:15-CV-353
(W.D. Mich. June 30, 2015). The district court dismissed the case with prejudice in June of 2015, finding
that it would require the court to impermissibly examine religious doctrine and that Means could file a
medical malpractice claim instead. No. 1:15-CV-353, 2015 WL 3970046 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2015).
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 836 F. 3d 643, 654 (2016).
121. Complaint at 6.
122. Id. at 5.
123. Id. at 2-3.
124. Molly Redden, Abortion Ban Linked to Dangerous Miscarriages at Catholic Hospital, Report
Claims, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/18/michigan-
catholic-hospital-women-miscarriage-abortion-mercy-health-partners.
125. Amended Complaint at 2, Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Trinity Health Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d
614 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (No. 15-cv-1 2611). The case was dismissed for lack of standing in March of 2016.
178 F. Supp. 3d at 616.
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Catholic healthcare systems in the country, owning and operating more than
ninety hospitals across the United States and treating thousands of patients each
year. 126 According to the Complaint, because of Trinity's adherence to the
Directives, a number of pregnant women who sought emergency care at Trinity
hospitals were denied that care and "bec[a]me septic, experienced hemorrhaging,
contracted life-threatening infections, and/or unnecessarily suffered severe pain
for several days at a time."127
As a result of the Directives, Catholic hospitals violate federal emergency
medical treatment law by categorically refusing to provide medically necessary
emergency abortions to women who are miscarrying as long as there is a fetal
heartbeat. 128 Often, this means that a hospital will deliberately allow a woman's
life to become endangered before taking action. In one case, a physician was told
that he could not admit a miscarrying woman until she contracted a life-
threatening infection, even though his ethical duty was to prevent such an
infection-a task easily achieved by providing immediate care.1 29 Even in the
case of ectopic pregnancy, which can never result in a live birth and is deadly to
the woman if left untreated, abortion is not allowed under the Directives. 130
Instead of administering a medication to expel the embryo from the fallopian
tube, some Catholic hospitals will force the woman to undergo invasive surgery
to remove her fallopian tube, thereby reducing her ability to become pregnant in
the future and exposing her to the dangers associated with surgery; other times,
hospitals will take a "wait and see" approach, putting the patient's health and life
at risk.13 1
In addition to the irreparable physical damage that can occur in emergency
care situations, conscience exemptions also create the opportunity for
unnecessary physical and emotional harm-as well as conflict among providers,
institutions, and patients-in the provision of relatively routine reproductive
healthcare. Conscience exemptions allow providers to refuse to prescribe or
discuss emergency contraception with rape victims or women who simply want
to avoid an unplanned pregnancy. Likewise, conscience exemptions allow
providers and institutions to prevent women from accessing other family
planning methods. For example, Dignity Health, the fifth-largest healthcare
system in the United States and the largest hospital provider in California,
complies with the Directives' prohibition on sterilization. 132 In December 2015,
126. About Us, TRINITY HEALTH, http://www.trinity-health.org/about-us.
127. Amended Complaint, supra note 125, at 2.
128. Freedman et al., supra note 103, at 1776-77; see Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
129. Tom C. W. Lin, Treating an Unhealthy Conscience: A Prescription for Medical Conscience
Clauses, 31 VT. L. REV. 105, 130 (2006).
130. Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 16, at 152-53.
131. Id.
132. Elizabeth Gill, Hospital Refuses Pregnancy-Related Care Again Because of Religious




the ACLU filed suit in Northern California against Dignity Health for refusing
to allow patient Rebecca Chamorro to undergo a tubal ligation, as recommended
by her doctor, during her scheduled caesarean section in late January 2016.133
Dignity Health's Mercy Medical Center is the only hospital in Chamorro's
hometown with a labor and delivery ward, and there are no hospitals with
birthing facilities within a seventy-mile radius that do not follow the
Directives. 134 Nevertheless, a superior court judge denied Chamorro an
injunction, leaving her with the difficult choice to either give birth far from her
home (which might not be possible should she go into labor early) or undergo
two expensive, separate surgeries: the birth of her child and a later tubal
ligation.' 35
Beyond the physical and emotional harm that they cause, conscience
exemptions create financial burdens for many patients. Chamorro, for example,
had to choose between the expense of separate surgeries and the expense
associated with traveling far away to give birth. Financial harms also occur when
a woman has to travel to several pharmacies before a pharmacist will fill her legal
contraceptive prescription, or when a woman has to pay out-of-pocket for an out-
of-network provider who will offer her medically indicated treatment. The broad
nature of conscience exemptions exacerbates the harm of a refusal; because
institutions may refuse to provide referrals or even information without the risk
of liability, refusal by an individual provider often means that the patient will not
be able to access care at all--or even know that care exists. When an entire
institution refuses to provide common medical procedures like contraception and
abortion, it further magnifies the risk to patients, particularly those who need
emergency or time-sensitive care.
As Fineman has explained, the formal equality framework does not
challenge "existing allocations of resources and power" and may in fact "validate
. . . existing institutional arrangements that privilege some and disadvantage
others." 36 This is certainly true in the case of conscience exemptions. They may
133. Id. On October 25, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union and its Michigan branch filed
an administrative complaint with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Civil
Rights against Ascension Health and its subsidiary Genesys Health System for refusing Jessica Mann's
request for a tubal ligation during her planned C-section in violation the Affordable Care Act's prohibition
on sex discrimination. Administrative Complaint, Mann v. Ascension Health, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field-document/
section_1 557_complaint.on.behalf of jessica mann andthe-aclu-oct._25_2015.pdf. Mann suffers
from a brain tumor, and her doctor recommended sterilization because the brain tumor could become life-
threatening if strained by another pregnancy. id. at 2. Genesys refused to allow Mann's doctor to perform
the tubal ligation procedure because it would violate the Directives. Id. at 3. Ascension Health receives
billions of dollars in federal funding annually and is the largest non-profit health system in the United
States. Id. at 3-4.
134. Gill, supra note 132.
135. Bob Egelko, Catholic Hospital Can Refuse Sterilization Requests, Judge Says, SFGATE (Jan.
14, 2016), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Judge-Catholic-hospital-can-refuse-requests-for-
6759627.php. "Chamorro ultimately delivered at the Catholic hospital and did not receive the tubal
ligation she desired." Kaye et al., supra note 6, at 24.
136. Fineman, supra note 62, at 3.
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have a stated goal of ensuring religious freedom for all, but they have the effect
of privileging the beliefs of a few while denying information and care to an
untold number of patients and contributing to a legal landscape of diminishing
access to reproductive healthcare.1 37 The state has an obligation to respond to
this inequality by limiting the ability of institutions and individual providers to
withhold information or care. Doing so would ensure that healthcare resources
are allocated to individuals who need them, and who will in turn become more
resilient in the face of human vulnerability.
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE REMEDIES THROUGH A VULNERABILITY THEORY LENS
The idea of the liberal subject who can negotiate for a service with equal
opportunity for information and relatively equivalent bargaining power is at its
most farcical in the healthcare setting. All humans are vulnerable to illness and
injury, but very few are privy to the knowledge and experience that healthcare
providers have. Individuals are in an even more precarious position due to the
increased prevalence of healthcare systems that control the actions of every
hospital, outpatient facility, clinic, and healthcare worker for miles around. In the
most extreme examples, as when a woman is doubled over in pain because
something in her pregnancy has gone very wrong, it is absurd to argue that she
must research her local hospitals and individual healthcare providers to ensure
that she finds a provider who will tell her the truth and a healthcare system that
will provide her the standard of care. It is also repugnant to tell a woman she
must go without critical healthcare if not a single institutional provider within a
seventy-mile radius is willing to perform a legal medical procedure or fill a legal
prescription even when her own doctor recommends the procedure or has
prescribed the medication.
Substantive equality within the reproductive healthcare setting cannot exist
alongside conscience exemptions as they are currently conceptualized.
Achieving substantive equality will require some state intervention to reallocate
the benefits that now accrue to the objecting institution or provider and the
burdens that fall on the willing patient. The vulnerable patient should not be
forced to bear what may be significant costs of another's exercise of conscience.
The burden that is now placed on the patient whose care is precariously
dependent on the conscience of her provider, hospital, or even insurance
company, should be shifted to those who hold the objection. Limiting conscience
exemptions would ensure that all people have more equal access to one of the
most important societal institutions. Within this already comprehensively
regulated industry, there is no reason why the government should not act to limit
the vulnerability of patients and demand that all patients have equal access to the
137. Sepper, supra note 30, at 406.
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medical standard of care in exchange for the government's role in the
institution's creation and funding.
A more balanced alternative to the current conscience exemption regime
would ensure that direct providers of care are accommodated so long as they
provide notice of their objections and an opportunity for alternative care in non-
emergency cases. This approach would comport with medical ethical guidelines,
which historically have allowed physicians to conscientiously object, subject to
the ethical compromise that physicians (and by extension all direct providers of
care) inform patients of treatment objections, refer for treatments they do not
provide, and do not abandon a patient already under their care.138 Healthcare
institutions would not be permitted to dictate moral positions on medical care. A
doctor who sought to perform a tubal ligation following a caesarian section, for
example, could not be prevented from doing so by institutional religious or
conscience-based policies against sterilization. By placing the burden on the
institution to ensure that care is provided so long as the institution has the
capability to do so, this approach largely resolves the potential for conflict
between patients and institutions. It also allows objecting healthcare providers
to, in most cases, transfer care seamlessly without damaging relationships with
patients.
A good example of this approach can be found under Washington law as it
regulates the practice of pharmacy in that state.1 39 In 2007, the Washington
Pharmacy Quality Assurance Commission, tasked with promulgating rules to
regulate pharmacy practice,14 0 adopted two new administrative rules known as
the "Pharmacist Responsibility Rule"1 4 1 and the "Delivery Rule." 42 The
Pharmacist Responsibility Rule regulates the individual professional conduct of
pharmacists. While the Pharmacist Responsibility Rule prohibits discrimination,
harassment, or intimidation of patients, it "does not require an individual
pharmacist to dispense medication in the face of a personal objection."1 43 Rather,
pharmacies may accommodate an objecting pharmacist as they deem
appropriate, "including [by] having another pharmacist available in person or by
telephone." 44 On the other hand, the Delivery Rule, which requires pharmacies
to "deliver lawfully prescribed drugs or devices to patients and to distribute drugs
138. Supra notes 16-21.
139. The Washington Pharmacy Quality Assurance Commission regulates the practice ofpharmacy
in the state of Washington and promulgates rules requiring the timely delivery of all prescription
medications by licensed pharmacies. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.64.001-.005 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. & Spec. Sess.).
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.005.
141. WASH. ADM[N. CODE § 246-863-095 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 15, 2017).
142. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 15, 2017).
143. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009).
144. Id.
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and devices . .. or provide a therapeutically equivalent drug or device in a timely
manner," contains no exemption for a conscientiously objecting pharmacy. 145
These rules, like the one at issue in Hobby Lobby,146 were challenged by
Stormans, a family-owned, privately held corporation.1 47 However, Washington
does not have a state analogue of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 148 so the Pharmacist Responsibility Rule and the Delivery Rule were tested
on free exercise and other constitutional grounds.14 9 The Ninth Circuit first
explained that, under First Amendment jurisprudence, neutral laws of general
applicability need only survive rational basis review to be constitutional. `0 The
court then held that the rules were both facially neutral and operationally neutral
because they specifically protect religiously motivated conduct of pharmacists
and, as applied to pharmacies, "the rules' delivery requirement applies to all
objections to delivery that do not fall within an exemption, regardless of the
motivation behind those objections."151 The court also found that the rules were
generally applicable, despite their enumerated exceptions, bpcause the
exceptions were "necessary reasons for failing to fill a prescription."152 Applying
rational basis review, the court determined that the rules were rationally related
to "Washington's legitimate interest in ensuring that its citizens have safe and
timely access to their lawful and lawfully prescribed medications."l53
Importantly, the Washington rules demonstrate that it is possible to balance
respect for an individual pharmacist's beliefs with the right of patients to access
care at their local pharmacies.
The right to safe and timely access to all forms of healthcare, including
reproductive healthcare, is no less important than the right of access to
prescription medication. Using vulnerability theory as a guide and incorporating
lessons learned from the Stormans cases, this Article proposes the following
federal legislation to reinstate the rights of patients and achieve balance between
powerful institutions and informed providers, on the one hand, and patients who
rely on institutions and providers for information and care, on the other:' 54
145. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1). The rule does provide that a pharmacy need not
deliver a drug or device under certain enumerated exceptions, including where the prescription may
potentially be fraudulent, the prescription contains an error, there is a known contraindication, there is a
national or state emergency affecting availability or supply, or the drug or device is unavailable. Id.
146. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (challenging the contraception mandate of
the Affordable Care Act under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(2012)).
147. Stormans, Inc. v. Weisman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433
(2016).
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4.
149. Stormans v. Weisman, 794 F.3d at 1071.
150. Id. at 1075 (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)).
151. Id. at 1076.
152. Id. at 1080 (quoting Stormans v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009)).
153. Id. at 1084.
154. The proposed legislation also takes into consideration § 1557 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which prohibits discrimination of the basis of sex and other protected
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(1) Whereas the government has a compelling interest in ensuring all
people have safe, timely, and equal access to medical care without
regard to personal characteristic or personal belief, institutions,
agencies, or individuals who receive Federal financial assistance from
the Department of Health and Human Services or other financial
assistance, including credits or subsidies from the Federal government
which relate to the provision of or are in exchange for the provision of
medical care to the public ("entities"), and which provide medical care
to the public, must comply with the following:
(a) Such entities have no right to (1) deny a person medical care
which is most likely to result in the best health outcome, or (2) deny
a person a non-contraindicated course of medical treatment
requested by the person, so long as the entities have the appropriate
facilities and individual medical providers freely willing to provide
such care or course of treatment in non-emergency situations.
(b) In the case of an emergency, medical care which is most likely
to result in the best health outcome for the person must be provided
using all available resources and personnel, regardless of any non-
medically based objection by an individual provider or institution.
(c) In emergent and non-emergency cases, institutions and
individual providers are jointly responsible for the provision of
medical referrals upon request and medically correct information
regarding all possible courses of treatment, regardless of whether
the institution is able to provide any individual course of treatment
or whether an individual provider is willing to provide any
individual course of treatment.
(2) Violations of this statute will be enforced through criminal and civil
sanctions by the federal government, as well as through a civil private
right of action which accrues to any person harmed by an individual or
entity's refusal of care, referral, or information.
This proposed legislation is designed to balance the rights and obligations of
all parties to an exchange of healthcare services and is drafted to withstand a
challenge on First Amendment or Religious Freedom Restoration Act
grounds.' The proposed legislation is facially neutral in that it makes no
characteristics in health programs administered or supported by the Department of Health and Human
Services and entities established under Title I of the ACA. See Office for Civil Rights, Section 1557 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section- 1557/. For example, hospitals receiving financial
assistance through their participation in Medicare are prohibited from discriminating against patients,
including those who are transgender, on the basis of sex. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-
2037, 2015 VL 1197415 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015). Notably, § 1557 does not contain a religious or
conscience exemption to its requirement of nondiscrimination in the provision of healthcare.
Unfortunately, though, § 1557 does not displace existing conscience exemptions. Thus, legislation like
the draft provided in this Article is critical to ensuring equal access to healthcare for all patients regardless
of the personal beliefs of those in the healthcare industry.
155. As explained in Stormans v. Weisman, free exercise legal challenges under the First
Amendment continue to be govemed by Employment Division v. Smith, 498 U.S. 872 (1990), which held
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reference to any religious practice or belief It is also operationally neutral
because the requirements for individual providers to provide care in emergency
situations, for institutions to provide care in all situations, and for providers and
institutions to ensure patients have access to all medically relevant information
and referrals make no exceptions and therefore treat those who might object on
secular grounds the same as those who might object on religious or conscience-
based grounds. The proposed legislation allows individual providers to
conscientiously object when doing so would not put a patient's care at risk, but
denies accommodation to institutions in similar circumstances where a willing
provider is available to provide care because, as described throughout, an
institutional conscience exemption would inevitably result in a lack of access to
care. This legislation is the least restrictive means of achieving the government's
compelling interest in ensuring that citizens and residents have safe and timely
access to medical care regardless of their personal characteristics or beliefs.
Further, this legislation is guided by the precepts of vulnerability theory, which
teaches that the state should intervene to ensure that individuals have access to
societal institutions that distribute resources that improve human resiliency.
Finally, it is designed to eliminate barriers that limit access to reproductive
healthcare.
CONCLUSION
The human body is fragile, and all people are vulnerable to injury and
disease. Healthcare institutions are some of our most important social institutions
because they increase the resiliency of the vulnerable human by preventing
disease and caring for the ill or injured. Vulnerability theory teaches that it is the
role of the state to respond to the vulnerability of all people by ensuring everyone
has access to healthcare institutions. Conscience exemptions have the opposite
effect: limiting access to care for people at their least resilient and privileging
powerful healthcare institutions and providers over patients in the name of
religious freedom and formal equality. In rejecting a due process challenge to the
regulations at issue in Stormans, the Ninth Circuit held:
[W]e are unconvinced that the right to own, operate, or work at a
licensed professional business free from regulations requiring the
that a neutral law of general applicability need only satisfy rational basis review, Stormans, Inc. v.
Weisman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015). The proposed statute satisfies rational basis review
because the federal government has a legitimate interest in ensuring all citizens have access to safe, timely
medical care. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act requires that, to be enforceable, a law that
substantially burdens the free exercise of religion must have a compelling government interest and must
be the least restrictive means to further that interest. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012). Assuming
arguendo that the proposed law substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, the text sets forth a
compelling government interest and meets the least-restrictive-means test by limiting the circumstances
under which a provider might have to act against his or her conscience.
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business to engage in activities that one sincerely believes leads to the
taking of a human life is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'56
Rather, it is the right to healthcare and the right to access social institutions
that improve the resiliency of vulnerable humans that are fundamental.'
Conscience exemptions must be limited in order to ensure that everyone has the
greatest possible access to healthcare.
156. Stormans v. Weisman, 794 F.3d at 1088 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)) (holding that the Washington regulations did not violate the due process rights of plaintiff
pharmacy and pharmacists).
157. While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly contain a right to healthcare and the Supreme
Court has never expressly found a fundamental right to healthcare, its "decisions in the areas of the right
to privacy and bodily integrity suggest the Constitution implicitly provides an individual the right to access
healthcare services at one's own expense from willing medical providers." KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HEALTH CARE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS 2 (July 9,
2012) (citing Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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